Are nominal wage changes skewed away from wage cuts? by Kenneth J. McLaughlin










eal-wage cuts are much more common
than nominal wage cuts.  Why?  By
deﬁnition, real cuts must be more com-
mon if inﬂation is positive.  Yet there might
be more to it.  Perhaps workers suffer from
money illusion.  Maybe managers cannot
cut pay in nominal terms, but they can cut
real wages.  As a result, a low-inﬂation
economy might be a high unemployment
economy.  And moderate inﬂation might
“grease the wheels” of the labor market.
These issues are being addressed in 
a burgeoning body of literature on wage
changes in panel data (McLaughlin 1994;
Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher 1995; Craig
1995; Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry 1996;
Card and Hyslop 1997; Kahn 1997; Altonji
and Devereux 1997; Crawford and Harrison
1997; and Christoﬁdes and Stengos 1998).
To detect the existence of downward rigidity
of nominal wages, this literature identiﬁes
properties of the distribution of wage changes:
• The frequency of wage cuts
• A spike or mass-point of observa-
tions with no change in pay
• Skewness
• Thinning of the distribution 
below zero
• Holes in the distribution 
around zero
Correlations of these properties with inﬂa-
tion also help to identify skewness away
from nominal wage cuts.
Although these papers have much 
in common, the speciﬁc techniques, data
sets, and even conclusions vary.  With a
series of simple calculations on a single data
set, I intend to integrate the main results
from this new and exciting area of research
to shed light on an important question for
macroeconomic policy and economic theo-
ry:  Are nominal wage changes skewed away
from wage cuts?  In particular, does down-
ward nominal rigidity censor some would-
be wage cuts, transforming some wage
changes that would be negative into zero-
wage changes?  To answer this question, I
document key properties of the distribution
of wage changes in panel data.  I show that
tests based on the familiar skewness coefﬁ-
cient are particularly weak in the presence 
of fat-tailed distributions, such as the distri-
bution of wage changes, so I introduce 
symmetrically differenced histograms, a
convenient way to detect asymmetries
visually.  I also apply mean-median differ-
ences and sign tests of symmetry to the
wage change data.
Evidence of skewness of wage changes
is decisive; however, establishing that wage
changes are skewed away from wage cuts
requires more than evidence of skewness 
of wage changes.  Is downward nominal
rigidity the source of the skewness of wage
changes, or is the distribution of wage
changes more generally skewed?  To sort
this out, I calculate measures of thinning, a
reduction in the frequency of wage change
observations below zero (Lebow, Stockton,
and Wascher 1995; Card and Hyslop 1997;
and Kahn 1997); the calculations do point
to the thinning of wage cuts.
A complete explanation also must
account for two other features of wage
change distributions.  First, by focusing 
on wage changes close to the median, I
show that wage changes are skewed right
over a range that has nothing to do with
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1 Card and Hyslop (1997, pp. 75-
76) conjecture that I failed 
to detect nominally induced
asymmetries because I pooled
annual distributions of real-wage
changes.  But pooling the distrib-
utions had no bearing on my
conclusions.  I reported the spike
at zero and positive skewness; 
I also found that wage changes
vary closely with inﬂation, skew-
ness does not vary with inﬂation,
and wage changes of nonunion
and nonminimum-wage workers
are symmetric (McLaughlin
1994).  These ﬁndings led me
to conclude that there was little
evidence of downward nominal
wage rigidity.
downward nominal rigidity at zero.  This
violates the mirror-image assumption of one
thinning estimator; consequently, Lebow,
Stockton, and Wascher; and Card and Hyslop
overestimate the thinning of nominal wage
cuts.  Second, I show that skewness of wage
changes is basically unrelated to inﬂation;
that is, higher inﬂation does not reduce
the impact of any nominal wage rigidity.
I begin by introducing the issues and
methods in the context of the literature.
ONE LITERATURE,  
TWO QUESTIONS
One can go a long way toward recon-
ciling disparate conclusions in the literature
by drawing a single distinction.  That is,
one must distinguish between the level or
frequency of nominal wage cuts and the
sensitivity of nominal cuts to downward
rigidities.  There is a distinct possibility
that nominal wage cuts are common and
wage changes are skewed away from wage
cuts.  The ﬁrst property of nominal wage
changes answers the question, “How com-
mon are wage cuts in nominal terms?”
The second property answers a comple-
mentary but distinct question:  Is there 
evidence of downward rigidity reducing
the frequency of nominal wage cuts?  One
could conclude that nominal wage cuts 
are common and that they would be more
common if nominal wages were not 
downwardly rigid.
Wage Cuts Are Common, 
But Are They Common Enough?
In McLaughlin (1994), I documented
that real-wage cuts are frequent and nominal
wage cuts are not rare.  Using survey-week
data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), I found that 43 percent
of workers who do not change employers
(i.e., stayers) suffer real cuts in straight-time
pay (hourly wage or salary) on the main
job.  For about 17 percent of the sample,
the wage cuts are nominal.  The subsequent
literature focuses on nominal wage changes.
Research by Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher
(1995) using the PSID; Craig (1995) using
intrayear data from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP); Card 
and Hyslop (1997) using the PSID and
matched samples from the Current Population
Survey (CPS); and Kahn (1997) using 
the PSID conﬁrms my ﬁndings of surpris-
ingly frequent reported wage cuts even 
for stayers.
Regarding the complementary question
of downward rigidity, my analysis was lim-
ited to computing (a) the size of the spike
at no change in pay and (b) skewness coefﬁ-
cients.  I found that an additional 7 percent
of the stayers report no change in pay from
year to year, and that the distribution of
wage changes was skewed to the right, away
from wage cuts (McLaughlin 1994).1
Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher; Card and
Hyslop; and Kahn also document the spike,
although Card and Hyslop (1997, note 13)
ﬁnd a substantially larger spike by analyz-
ing hourly workers.  Some of the spike at
zero could be due to variation in interview
dates in the PSID.  Lebow, Stockton, and
Wascher estimate that 1 percentage point
of an 8-percentage-point spike is attribut-
able to interviews occurring within a year.
They also estimate that an additional 3
percentage points are due to rounding of
wage reports.  Card and Hyslop (1997, 
p. 83), on their CPS sample of hourly
workers, also estimate that about half of
the spike is attributable to rounding errors.
This literature takes a variety of
approaches to estimating skewness of wage
changes.  Using the skewness coefﬁcient, I
found that the overall distribution of wage
changes is skewed to the right; however, I
also reported that the distributions of wage
changes of nonunion workers, nonmini-
mum-wage workers, and salaried workers
are dead-on symmetric (McLaughlin 1994,
Table 2).  Similarly, Lebow, Stockton, and
Wascher report small positive skewness
coefﬁcients for all stayers, and sizable posi-
tive skewness coefﬁcients for hourly work-
ers.  (See also Crawford and Harrison (1997)
and Christoﬁdes and Stengos (1998) for
skewness estimates of wage changes in
Canadian union contract data.)
The subsequent literature focuses on
the complementary question by estimatingMAY/JUNE 1999
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whether nominal wage cuts are too rare;
that is, whether the left side of the distribu-
tion is too thin below zero (Lebow, Stockton,
and Wascher 1995; Card and Hyslop 1997;
Kahn 1997).  Lebow, Stockton, and
Wascher’s measure of skewness subtracts
the proportion of observations below zero
from the proportion above twice the median.
Since zero and twice the median are the
same distance from the median, this thin-
ness measure would be zero for symmetric
distributions and positive for right-skewed
distributions.  Their skewness measure is
6.8, so the left tail below zero is about 7
percentage points thinner than its mirror
image on the right side of the distribution.
Card and Hyslop also assume that the right
tail would be the mirror image of the left
in the absence of nominal rigidity.  For
each year, they provide kernel estimates
(basically smoothing) of the actual and
counterfactual histograms and ﬁnd a range
of thinning from 6 to 14 percentage points,
depending on the year.  These are in line
with Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher’s esti-
mate of 10-percentage-point thinning for
hourly workers.
By using year-to-year variation in the
position of the wage change distribution,
Kahn (1997) estimates the extent of nominal
rigidities without imposing the mirror-
image assumption.  One checks whether
bars of the wage-change histogram tend 
to be shorter in years when those bars lie
below zero.  For instance, is the third bar
below the median shorter in those years
when it lies below zero?  Kahn’s regression
estimates, which weight the effects across
bars, imply that 9 percent of hourly workers’
would-be wage cuts are censored at zero.
The only evidence of downward rigidity
for salaried workers is early in her sample
period (before 1982), but this evidence
appears to be dominated by more frequent
than expected nominal cuts after 1982.
With the two questions distinguished,
the papers in this literature share much in
common.  Nominal wage cuts are not rare,
but there is evidence of a spike at zero,
positive or right skew of distribution, and
thinning of the distribution below zero.
The evidence is much weaker, however, for
salaried workers and nonunion workers.
Another common feature is that about
three-quarters of would-be wage cuts actu-
ally occur.  Removing downward nominal
rigidity would increase the frequency of
reported wage cuts of stayers from the
observed 17 percent to 22 percent (using
Kahn’s estimates of thinning) or from 18
percent up to 24 percent (using Lebow,
Stockton, and Wascher’s estimates of thin-
ning).  Even in the CPS sample of hourly
wage workers, about three-quarters of the
predicted wage cuts appear in the data
(Card and Hyslop 1997).
If nominal wages are downwardly rigid,
then there should be less skewness and thin-
ning in high inﬂation periods.  The evidence
on this important point is mixed.  I found that
the skewness coefﬁcient is positively corre-
lated with anticipated and unanticipated
inﬂation, which is not consistent with inﬂa-
tion relaxing the impact of nominal wage
rigidity (McLaughlin 1994, note 12).  Lebow,
Stockton, and Wascher’s (1995) thinness
measure is not signiﬁcantly correlated with
inﬂation on their sample of all stayers, although
the correlation is negative for hourly work-
ers.  On the CPS sample of hourly workers,
Card and Hyslop (1997) ﬁnd less thinning in
high inﬂation periods.  Hence any evidence
of inﬂation reducing the impact of nominal
wage rigidity is limited to hourly workers.
But Are Wage Cuts Common?
Perhaps survey reports of wages are
riddled with error and the appearance of
nominal wage cuts is illusory.  The wage
variables in these surveys refer to straight-
time pay on the main job during the survey
week or the most recent pay period; wages
are not generated by dividing annual earn-
ings last year by annual hours worked.
Indeed, for the SIPP data on hourly workers,
a respondent is asked what the hourly wage
rate was on his last pay stub (Craig 1995).
But the role of measurement error in inﬂat-
ing reported wage cuts deserves scrutiny.
To identify the frequency of true wage
cuts, I estimated the variance of the mea-
surement error component and applied a
mean-preserving compression to correctMAY/JUNE 1999
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2 Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry
(1996, note 10) criticize my
use of a mean-preserving com-
pression to correct the distribu-
tion of wage changes.  Their
criticism builds from the
assumption that the true distrib-
ution of wage changes is asym-
metric.  Wage changes are not
severely skewed, however, and
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry do
not assess how sensitive my
corrections are to mild asymme-
tries.  In addition, one can redo
my calculations on symmetric
subsamples without affecting
any of my conclusions
(McLaughlin 1999).
3 This point was driven home
recently when a colleague of
mine reported that his salary
for the new academic year had
dropped 25 percent.  The union
pay scale governing his employ-
ment has not changed in years,
but he had completed his term
as acting dean.
the distribution of wage changes (McLaughlin
1994).  I took three very different tacks to
estimate the error variance:
• First, I drew reliability measures 
of wage change variables from 
validation studies (Bound and 
Krueger 1991; Bound, Brown, 
Duncan, and Rodgers 1994).
• Second, I used the frequency of 
reported nominal wage cuts of 
minimum-wage workers, which
were assumed to be due to mea-
surement error.
• Third, I associated measurement 
error with the stationary component 
of wage change residuals, and the 
random walk component of wages 
was classiﬁed as true variation.
The three methods pointed to a single
conclusion.  Although signiﬁcant measure-
ment error is present in wage changes,
wage cuts remain fairly common in the
corrected distributions.2 In particular, my
most conservative measurement error cor-
rection reduced the frequency of nominal
wage cuts from 17 percent to 12 percent.
Suspicious that measurement error is 
the source of reported nominal wage cuts,
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) asked
respondents in a Washington, D.C., telephone
survey whether they had experienced wage
cuts during the previous year.  That is, rather
than differencing wage responses across
years, Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry asked a
single qualitative question directly.  About 
3 percent of the stayers reported cuts in base
pay.  Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry conclude
that the frequency of wage cuts in panel data
is an artifact of measurement error.  It is well
known, however, that survey respondents
under report embarrassing personal informa-
tion, so this survey instrument probably
undercounts wage cuts.
In a comment on Card and Hyslop
(1997), Shea (1997) assesses the reliability
of wage reports of union workers in the
PSID.  Shea matches union workers in 
the PSID to union wage settlements by
industry, occupation, location, and year.
Since very few of the reported wage cuts
align with union wage concessions, Shea
concludes that most nominal wage cuts in
the PSID are attributable to measurement
error.  A problem with Shea’s method is that
wages of union workers change without
corresponding changes in union pay scales.
Union wages are typically assigned to jobs,
and workers regularly move from job to job
in some union ﬁrms.  This was the case in
the large manufacturing ﬁrm used in the
PSID’s Validation Study; indeed, workers 
in the validation study had great difﬁculty
reporting hourly wages because they
changed job assignments week-to-week and
even day-to-day (Bound, Brown, Duncan,
and Rodgers 1994).3
Altonji and Devereux (1997) provide
maximum-likelihood estimates of an
empirical model of wage rigidity and mea-
surement error.  They exploit cross-sec-
tional variation in the position of the wage
change distribution to estimate thinning.
That is, Altonji and Devereux replace
Kahn’s (1997) time-series variation with
cross-sectional variation in the distribution’s
position, and they add a distributional
assumption in the process.  In addition,
Altonji and Devereux simultaneously 
estimate the variance of the measurement
component.  For their model to account
for the spike at zero nominal wage growth,
small wage cuts must be censored.  Hence,
the presence of small wage cuts in the data
must (in their model) be attributed to
measurement error.  Altonji and Devereux
conclude that about 80 percent of observed
wage cuts are an artifact of measurement
error; however, this would overstate the
extent of measurement error if some small
wage cuts were genuine.
The extent of measurement error 
is important for assessing the frequency 
of nominal wage cuts but not for the 
complementary question posed in this
paper:  Is there evidence of downward 
rigidity reducing the frequency of nominal
wage cuts?  Adding a symmetric measure-
ment-error component would not bias 
any of the skewness tests or thinning 
measures.MAY/JUNE  1999
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WAGE CHANGES IN THE PSID
To determine whether wage changes
are skewed away from wage cuts, I use
data from the PSID, which has followed
thousands of households since 1968.  The
PSID includes annual observations covering
survey week pay with the main employer.
My measure of wages is the respondent’s
report of his survey week pay on his main
job.  For hourly workers, I use the straight-
time hourly wage rate.  For salaried workers;
I do not  convert salaries into hourly wage
rates; hours-induced wage variability
might mask salary rigidity.  This is particu-
larly important in light of the errors in
reported hours of work (Bound, Brown,
Duncan, and Rodgers 1994).  Wage
changes are the annual differences of 
log wages times 100.
My data set combines the PSID’s 1992
cross-year individual ﬁle with 22 annual
family ﬁles.  Because downward wage
rigidities are not expected to be important
for workers who change employers, the
sample is limited to household heads
(since 1971) and spouses (since 1979)
who stayed with their employers since the
previous year (i.e., stayers).  To be included
in the sample, a worker must also report
his wage in adjacent years.4 In the resulting
sample, 5,887 persons contribute 34,633
person-year observations on wage changes
—an average of nearly six wage-change
observations per person.
Do Wage Changes Reﬂect 
Money Illusion?
The bigger issue is money illusion.
Downward wage rigidities associated with
infrequent wage cuts would constitute
money illusion, but placing the issue in a
wider context is essential.  The broader
question is:  How do nominal wages move
with the price level?  Or equivalently:  How
does the rate-of-change of nominal wages
vary with the inﬂation rate?  Perhaps some
nominal wage cuts are censored at zero, but
the overall distribution of wage changes
could be tightly linked to inﬂation.
This is the case in longitudinal data
from the PSID.  For each annual sample 
of stayers, I compute the average rate-of-
change of nominal wage over the previous
year.  Table 1 contains the results of
regressing this annual wage change variable
(in percentage terms) on the rate of inﬂa-
tion, based on the GDP Deﬂator.  Consistent
with my earlier ﬁndings (McLaughlin
1994, p. 403), nominal wages move closely
with the price level.  The estimated effect
is .84, which is 1.6 standard deviations
from one, so the hypothesis that nominal
wages and prices move one for one is 
not rejected.  The test is not decisive, 
so a suspicion of incomplete indexing 
of wages to prices might remain.
However, suspicion of incomplete
indexing or money illusion vanishes if the
inﬂation rate is partitioned into anticipated
and unanticipated components.  To reach
this conclusion, I use time-series methods
to generate one-step-ahead forecasts of
inﬂation (i.e., anticipated inﬂation) and
forecast errors (i.e., unanticipated inﬂa-
tion).  Like Pearce (1979), and Fama and
Gibbons (1984), I ﬁnd that the inﬂation
rate is the sum of a random-walk compo-
nent and a stationary component; in par-
4 Also excluded are top-coded
observations, which were com-
mon during the mid-1970s.  See
McLaughlin (1999) for details of
the sample exclusions.
Nominal Wage Changes and Inflation
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1971-92
Inflation Process
Variable  ARIMA (0,1,1)  AR(3)  ARIMA (0,1,1)
Intercept  3.309  3.063  2.847
(.602)  (.589)  (.645)
Inﬂation  .840
(.103)
Anticipated Inﬂation  .880  .928  .918
0(.101)  0(.113)  0(.049)
Unanticipated Inﬂation  .584  .592  .717
0(.176)  0(.183)  0(.100)
R2 .777  .810  .805  .018
No. of Observations  21  21  21  34,633
Unit of Observations  Annual Avg.  Annual Avg.  Annual Avg.  Individualb
Table 1
a Least-squares regressions with standard errors in parentheses.  Nominal wage changes are for
stayers in the PSID; inﬂation is based on the GDP Deﬂator. All variables are computed as annual
differences of logs.
b Additional regressors include years of age and education, as well as indicators of sex, race, mar-
riage, disability, occupation, industry, and union status, and change in union status; an intercept
is also included.MAY/JUNE 1999
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5 The result also is conﬁrmed in
aggregate data (e.g., Startz,
this issue).  The principal
advantage of using panel data
is in controlling for sample 
composition; in addition, 
using panel data at the 
individual level allows for 
additional regressors.
6 Ahmad and Li (1997) have 
proposed a formal test of 
symmetry that is closely related 
to symmetrically differenced his-
tograms, and their test has been
applied to Canadian wage-change
data by Christoﬁdes and Stengos
(1998).  The test amounts to
summing the squares of the val-
ues of the symmetrically differ-
enced histogram.  Ahmad and Li
prove that the kernel-based test
statistic is asymptotically normal.
ticular, the ﬁrst difference of the inﬂation
rate follows a ﬁrst-order moving-average
process (i.e., MA(1)), so the inﬂation rate
is an integrated ﬁrst-order moving-average
(i.e., ARIMA(0,1,1)) process.  (Details are
available on request.)
Table 1 displays the results of regressing
nominal wage changes on anticipated and
unanticipated inﬂation rates.  Nominal wage
changes move one-for-one with anticipated
inﬂation, and there is a strong (but weak-
er) positive relationship between nominal
wage changes and unanticipated inﬂation.
The results are robust to alternative speciﬁ-
cations of the time-series process.  For instance,
in Table 1, the relationship between nomi-
nal wage changes and inﬂation components
is essentially unchanged if a third-order
autoregressive model is used to compute
anticipated and unanticipated inﬂation
rates.  So incomplete indexing of nominal
wages to prices appears to reﬂect that
inﬂation is not fully anticipated.
This result is conﬁrmed on individual-
level data from the PSID.5 Here I regress
an individuals’ nominal wage change on
anticipated and unanticipated inﬂation
rates, as well as on the labor economist’s
standard set of regressors (including years
of age and education and indicators of sex,
race, occupation, industry, and union sta-
tus).  The estimated effects of the inﬂation
components, which are reported in Table 1,
conﬁrm the pattern.  From the relationship
between nominal wage changes and com-
ponents of inﬂation, there is no evidence
of money illusion.
In terms of monetary policy, this 
suggests no role for moderate inﬂation in
greasing the wheels of the labor market.
Suppose, however, that one detects evi-
dence of nominal rigidity by focusing on
the nominal wage change distribution
around zero.  Such evidence of money
illusion might be treated as a problem 
to be solved by monetary policy, but
downward rigidity around zero should 
be treated as a higher-order problem.  
The wider context—that the overall 
distribution of nominal wage changes
moves one-for-one with anticipated 
inﬂation—must not be dropped.
Subtracting the Left Side 
from the Right Side
Visual inspection of a distribution can
sometimes reliably detect departures from
symmetry.  But visually inspecting the his-
togram, matching bars on each side of the
distribution, can be misleading if depar-
tures from symmetry are not severe.  This
is particularly important in the current
context, where stayers’ wage change his-
tograms in the PSID appear to be fairly
symmetric (McLaughlin 1994).
To aid the eye, I present symmetrically
differenced histograms.  I compute the 
histogram based on equal-sized intervals
around the median, ﬂip the left side of 
the distribution over onto the right, and
difference the two.6 Here I subtract the
left from the right, so a positive (negative)
value indicates that the right (left) side 
of the distributions is thicker than the 
left (right) side over that particular 
interval.  Since the histogram sums to 
100 percent (with 50 percent on each 
side of the median), the symmetrically 
differenced histogram sums to zero.
For a sample drawn from a symmetric
distribution, the symmetrically differenced
histogram would be a scatter of points
along the zero line.  Alternatively, suppose
the left side of the nominal wage change
distribution was thinned below zero, with
these would-be wage cuts piling up at zero.
Such a density function is illustrated in the
upper-left panel of Figure 1, and its sym-
metrically differenced histogram in the
lower-left panel.  Since the spike at zero
lies below the median, the symmetrically
differenced histogram has a negative spike
at twice the median.  (A reference line is
drawn at the median.)  Values are zero up
to twice the median, and positive values
beyond this point reﬂect that the left tail 
is thinner than the right.
In addition, perhaps some small wage
increases or decreases are censored at zero.
The right two panels of Figure 1 illustrate
such a density function and its symmetri-
cally differenced histogram.  By censoring
half of the small wage changes, two positive
spikes surround the negative spike in the
lower-right panel.  So if nominal rigiditiesMAY/JUNE  1999
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censor some wage cuts and some small
wage changes, the symmetrically differenced
histogram should resemble the lower-right
panel of Figure 1.
For the sample of stayers in the PSID,
the symmetrically differenced histogram 
in Figure 2 does resemble the lower-right
panel in Figure 1.  (The stayers’ histogram
of wage changes is also depicted in Figure
2.)  Small positive spikes surround a large
negative spike at twice the median, which
indicates some censoring of small wage
changes.  Values tend to be positive for
wage changes beyond twice the median,
which indicates that, below zero, the left
side of the distribution is thinner than the
right.  But this symmetrically differenced
histogram reveals more than partial cen-
soring of small wage changes and wage
cuts.  Two negative values appear just 
to the right of the median reference line.
Thus, wage changes just to the left of 
the median are more common than those
just to the right of the median.  This prop-
erty is common for right-skewed distribu-
tions, such as the log-normal.  But the
presence of this property in the context 
of wage changes is important.  There is
more to the skewness of the wage change
distribution than is implied by the censor-
ing of some wage cuts and some small
wage changes.
Test Statistics
Visual evidence from the symmetrically
differenced histograms can be put to formal
tests by computing the skewness coefﬁcient,
the mean-median difference, and the sign
test statistic.  On a sample of size N  from
distribution function F, I test the null
hypothesis H0 that the distribution of 
wage changes x  is symmetric; that is,
F(x)=1–F(–x)  for all values of the random
variable x.
The skewness coefﬁcient, perhaps the
most familiar measure of symmetry, is the
ratio of the third central moment of x  to
Figure 1
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the cubed standard deviation of x.  Under
the null hypothesis H0, the asymptotic dis-
tribution of the skewness coefﬁcient is
normal with mean zero and variance: 
where  s  is the standard deviation of x, and
mk denotes the kth central moment of x
(Gupta 1967).  If F  were the normal distri-
bution, then the variance of the skewness
coefﬁcient would simplify to 6/N.
As a test of symmetry, the skewness
coefﬁcient has problems with false nega-
tives.  First, some skewed distributions
have zero third moments (Mood, Graybill,
and Boes 1974, p. 76).  Second, because 
the skewness coefﬁcient is sensitive to 
tail observations, the fourth and sixth
moments associated with fat-tail distribu-
tions severely inﬂate the variance of 
the test statistic; that is, fat tails produce 
high-variance skewness coefﬁcients.  
This explains why skewness coefﬁcients
applied to wage change distributions,
which have fat tails (McLaughlin 1994),
tend to jump around from sample to sam-
ple (Crawford and Harrison 1997) and 
are sensitive to tail observations (Lebow,
Stockton, and Wascher 1995).  Properly
computed standard errors reﬂect this, 
but long-tails render the test weak in
detecting even strongly skewed alternative
distributions.  Indeed, the skewness coefﬁ-
cient has trouble  detecting the asymmetry
of the log-normal distribution
(McLaughlin 1999).
Table 2 provides a good illustration 
of this problem with the skewness coefﬁ-
cient.  Despite the apparent skewness of
the wage change distribution in the PSID,
a test based on the skewness coefﬁcient
fails to reject the null hypothesis of sym-
metry.  The estimated skewness coefﬁcient
is .36, but its standard error is .30; howev-
er, since the distribution of wage changes
has fat tails, this test’s failure to detect
skewness is not surprising.
Most tables of critical values for 
the skewness coefﬁcient are based on a
normal distribution of x.  If the distribu-
tion of x  has fat tails, such critical values
are biased toward zero, which generates 
a problem with false positives.  For com-
parison, Table 2 also includes the standard
error of the skewness coefﬁcient under
normality.  This standard error is as small
as .01.  Symmetry is clearly rejected, 
but at this point, whether the rejection 
is valid or spurious remains unknown.
A simple by-product of positive 
(negative) skewness is that the mean 
lies to the right (left) of the median, 
which motivates the mean-median difference
(Hotelling and Solomons 1932) as a test.
Under the null hypothesis of symmetry, the
difference between the mean and the medi-
an is expected to be zero; furthermore, if
the median m  is treated as known, then by 
the Central Limit Theorem, the mean-
median difference is asymptotically 
normal with variance s
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median difference reported in Table 2 is .81
percentage points, which clearly rejects
symmetry in favor of a wage change distrib-
ution skewed away from wage cuts.
Indeed, the mean is estimated to be 8.4
standard errors to the right of the median.
What lies between the mean and the
median also contributes to a test of symme-
try.  The sign test statistic  (e.g., Gastwirth
1971) counts (and signs) the observations
between the mean and median.  Under H0,
the number of observations below the mean
is distributed binomial with parameters N
and 1/2.  By invoking the normal approxi-
mation to the binomial, the number of
observations between the mean and the
median is approximately normal with mean
zero and variance N/4.  In Table 2, results
of the sign test applied to wage changes in
the PSID also reject the null hypothesis of
symmetry.  In a sample of this size, it
would not be surprising to ﬁnd 100 or so
observations between the mean and the
median.  More than 1,200 observations lie
between the mean and median, however.
Table 2 also contains a check of the
sensitivity of the symmetry tests to the
presence of the spike at zero.  If all the
zero-wage-change observations were
would-be wage cuts or small wage changes
censored at zero, these observations would
belong in the calculations.  Alternatively,
these observations could reﬂect the round-
ing of wage responses or the timing of the
survey (with some wages changing soon
after the survey date).  Neither factor con-
stitutes an asymmetry of wage changes.  By
removing the spike at nominal zero, the
skewness tests can isolate the contribution
of “thinning” the distribution below zero.
In the lower half of Table 2, I report the
skewness test statistics on the sample that
excludes observations with no change in
nominal wages.  All three skewness test
statistics fall, providing weaker rejections
of symmetry.  But wage changes remain
skewed right.
Thinning of the Distribution 
Below Zero
While these tests reveal skewness, 
they do not address the question of skew-
ness away from wage cuts.  To address 
this question, Table 2 includes Lebow,
Stockton, and Wascher’s (1995) measure
of thinning, the proportion above twice
the median minus the proportion below
zero.  The wage change distribution below
zero is nearly 8 percentage points thinner
than its mirror image on the right side of
the distribution.  If zero wage change
observations are excluded, the thinness
measure falls to about 4 percentage points.
Intertemporal variation in the wage
change distribution provides another way
to identify thinning of the distribution
below zero (Kahn 1997).  This idea is 
simple and powerful.  Take an interval a
few percentage points below the median.
When nominal wage growth is high 
(i.e., when inﬂation tends to be high), 
that interval lies above zero.  In low nomi-
nal wage growth years, that interval might
lie below zero.  (In some years, the interval
might span zero.)  Kahn’s idea is to compare
the histogram’s values for that interval
when it lies to the right and left of zero.  
Skewness Test Statisticsa
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1971-92
Sample  Skewness  Mean –  Sign  Thinness
Coefﬁcient  Median  Test  Measure
Including the Spike 0.335  0.811  1,242.5  7.89
at Zero  (0.298)  (0.096)  (93.1)
[0.013]
±48 Point Band Around  0.077  0.687  1,068.5  7.85
the Median  (0.024)  (0.070)  (91.8)
[0.013]
±5 Point Band Around  0.058  0.065  200.5
the Median  (0.012)  (0.022)  (59.8)
[0.020]
Excluding the Spike 0.248  0.586  837.5  4.11
at Zero  (0.291)  (0.104)  (89.2)
[0.014]
±48 Point Band Around  –0.023  0.470  725.5  4.04
the Median  (0.024)  (0.075)  (87.9)
[0.014]
±5 Point Band Around  0.151  0.206  302.0
the Median  (0.012)  (0.023)  (60.1)
[0.020]
Table 2
a The sample contains 34,633 observations on the wage changes of ﬁrm stayers. Standard errors
of the test statistics are reported in parentheses; displayed in brackets are the standard errors of
the skewness coefﬁcient under the assumption of normality.MAY/JUNE 1999
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If the value of the histogram on the interval
is smaller when it lies below zero, there is
evidence of wage changes being skewed
away from wage cuts.
Kahn estimates econometric speciﬁca-
tions that essentially weight all the intervals
that move above and below zero.  But her
idea can be implemented most directly by
picking a few intervals that pass zero.  My
symmetrically differenced histograms use
intervals two percentage points wide.  The
third and fourth intervals below the medi-
an (i.e., 4-6 and 6-8 percentage points
below the median) lie above zero in high
inﬂation years and below zero in low inﬂa-
tion years.  For each interval, Table 3 reports
values of the histogram in years when the
interval was above and below zero.  Wage
change observations on interval 3 are 2.1
percent more common when that interval
lies above zero.  For interval 4, the difference
of the histogram values is only .4 percent.
As with any difference estimator, there is
the question of a control group.  If the sample
in low wage-growth years has lower variance
of wage changes, the tails of the distribution
would be thinner even if would-be wage cuts
were not censored at zero.  Perhaps the com-
position of the sample differs when nominal
wage changes are higher, or as Card and
Hyslop (1997, p. 86) argue, perhaps the dis-
persion of wage changes is affected by inﬂa-
tion.7 This issue can be addressed with a
difference-in-difference estimator.  I use the
change in the corresponding interval above
the median as the control.  Difference-in-dif-
ference estimates in Table 3 are a bit larger:
2.5 on interval 3 and 1.9 on interval 4.
Overall, these histogram difference estimates
do point to a thinning of tails below nominal
zero, with a thinning of one-third to one-half
of would-be cuts near zero.
Are Censored Wage Cuts 
the Only Source of Skewness?
If thinning of the wage-change distrib-
ution below zero were the only source of
skewness, then (a) extreme tail observa-
tions would not be the main source of
skewness, and (b) wage changes close to
the median would be symmetric, since
these observations would not be affected
by any downward nominal rigidity at zero.
That is, the distribution’s right side is pre-
dicted to be heavier than its left side over
the range of wage cuts, but not over the
entire range of wage changes.  These impli-
cations can be checked directly.
First, to check whether skewness is
limited to tail observations, I exclude wage-
change observations that contribute to the
bottom and top histogram bars in Figure 2.
This eliminates 1.19 percent from the left
side and 1.44 percent from the right, so
these tail observations contribute to the
right skew.  Skewness test statistics are 
computed on the remaining wage-change
observations, which lie within 48 percentage
points of the median.  The results in Table 2
reveal that positive skewness survives trim-
ming the tails.  Extreme wage change 
observations do not account for all of 
the skewness, a result consistent with
downward nominal rigidities.
Second, based on the symmetrically
differenced histogram in the lower panel of
Figure 2, wage changes just to the left of
the median are more common than those
just to the right of the median.  This prop-
erty is typical of right-skewed distributions
such as the log-normal.  In Table 2, on the
sample of wage changes within 5 percent-
age points of the median, the test statistics
reject symmetry.8 Since this band does not
include wage cuts, the spike at zero, or
small wage increases, the source of skew-
ness of wage changes is not limited to the
censoring of would-be wage cuts and small
wage changes.  Skewness seems to be a
more general property of wage changes.
Skewness close to the median presents a
problem for the thinning estimates of Lebow,
Stockton, and Wascher (1995) and Card and
Hyslop (1997); these estimates rely on the
mirror-image assumption that the distribu-
tion of wage changes would be symmetric if
not for downward nominal rigidity.  If the
overall distribution were skewed right,
which is consistent with the evidence close
to the median, then the mirror-image
assumption would be violated, and their esti-
mates of thinning would overstate the extent
of downward nominal rigidity.
7 Composition of my sample from
the PSID does vary:  The uni-
verse of wage respondents
widened beginning in 1976,
and household spouses are
included beginning in 1979.
8 Unfortunately, properties of
symmetry test statistics can
reverse as the band around the
median narrows.  For instance,
with a log-normal distribution,
as the band around the median
becomes very narrow, the
skewness test statistics change
sign.  The ±5 percentage point
band appears to be wide
enough to avoid this problem,
but I prefer to rely on the clear
evidence in Figure 2.MAY/JUNE  1999
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How severe is the bias?  This depends on
how skewed the overall distribution would
have to be to generate the observed skewness
near the median.  One could generalize from
the estimates of skewness near the median
to generate an overall distribution that is
skewed for reasons unrelated to downward
nominal rigidities.  In particular, the Box-
Cox transformation that renders the obser-
vations close to the median symmetric
could be applied to the overall distribution
to generate a counterfactual distribution.9
A corrected estimate of thinning differ-
ences the proportions of wage cuts in the
actual and counterfactual distributions.10
Although skewness near the median
might not appear strong in Table 2, observa-
tions near the median are strongly skewed,
more skewed than can be explained by even
a log-normal distribution.  In particular,
sending the Box-Cox parameter to zero is
not sufﬁcient to produce symmetry near
the median.  The implied counterfactual
distribution would be so strongly skewed
that “corrected” estimates of thinning
would identify upward  nominal rigidity.
Although these unreported results do not
qualify as serious corrections, they are
instructive.  Skewness near the median is
too severe to ignore; and estimates of thin-
ning by Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher and
Card and Hyslop probably overstate the
extent of downward nominal rigidity sub-
stantially.
Does Inﬂation Reduce Skewness
Away From Wage Cuts?
The evidence that wage changes are
skewed is deﬁnitive, but inﬂation’s role
remains to be determined.  Does inﬂation
render less restrictive a constraint against
nominal wage cuts?  Or, if the nominal
rigidity at zero is the source of skewness
away from wage cuts, does inﬂation 
reduce the skewness of the wage change
distribution?  By identifying how the test
statistics vary with inﬂation, this can be
checked directly.
If inﬂation relaxes the constraint, 
then skewness of the distribution of wage
changes would be less severe in high-inﬂa-
tion periods.  To test this, I compute each
test statistic (i.e., skewness coefﬁcient,
mean-median difference, sign test, and
thinness measure) annually.  (The four 
test statistics are highly correlated across
years.)  The results of correlating the
annual test statistics with inﬂation are
reported in Table 4.  The correlations are
small and statistically insigniﬁcant, and
only the thinness measure’s correlation is
negative.  So wage changes in the PSID
contain no evidence of less skewed distrib-
utions of wage changes in years when
inﬂation was higher.
This result is robust to partitioning
inﬂation into anticipated and unanticipat-
ed components.  For inﬂation to grease 
the wheels, it must shift the distribution 
of wage changes away from zero, and this
is more likely for anticipated inﬂation.
Table 4 contains correlations of the skew-
ness statistics separately with anticipated
and unanticipated inﬂation.  Based on the
three main skewness measures, neither
anticipated nor unanticipated inﬂation
reduces the skewness of nominal wage
changes.  Only the thinness measure corre-
lates signiﬁcantly negatively with antici-
pated inﬂation.
The negative correlations of inﬂation
and anticipated inﬂation with the thinness
9 The Box-Cox transformation is
(y  –1)
l  / l   , where y  is 1+D   w.
For 0 £ l   < 1, this transforma-
tion is strictly concave, which
reduces skewness to the right.
10This is a difference-in-difference
estimator.  Wage-change obser-
vations close to the median
constitute the control group,
which are unaffected by the
treatment of downward nomi-
nal rigidity.  These observations
are used to estimate how much
thicker the right side would be
than the left in the absence of
downward nominal rigidity.
This adjustment factor is then
differenced from Lebow,
Stockton, and Wascher’s or
Card and Hyslop’s difference
estimates.
Histogram Difference Estimates of Downward
Nominal Rigiditiesa
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1971-92
Sample  Interval 3  Interval 4
Left of Median
Years When Interval Is Above Zero  -6.29  -3.36
Years When Interval Is Below Zero  -4.23  -2.96
Difference  -2.06  -0.40
Right of Median
Years When Intervalb Is Above Zero  -4.43  -4.57
Years When Interval
b Is Below Zero  -5.82  -6.04
Difference  –0.39  –1.47
Difference-in-Difference  -2.45  -1.87
Table 3
a Table entries are histogram values and differences in histogram values. The length of each inter-
val is two percentage points.  Intervals 3 and 4 lie 4-6 and 6-8 percentage points away from
year-speciﬁc medians.
b Histogram values to the right of the median are computed separately for years when the indicat-
ed interval to the left of the median lies above and below zero.MAY/JUNE  1999
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measure are probably biased down.  The
median wage change varies with inﬂation,
hence thinning is measured farther out in
the distribution’s tails in high inﬂation
years.  Maintain the mirror-image assump-
tion, and the correlation of thinness with
inﬂation detects inﬂation’s role in relaxing
any constraint of nominal wage cuts.  Drop
the mirror-image assumption, and the cor-
relation is almost surely biased down.
Suppose the distribution of wage changes
is skewed right for reasons unrelated to
downward rigidity.  Then moving farther
out in the tails surely reduces the measure
of thinness even in the absence of down-
ward nominal rigidity.  Consequently, the
correlation of Lebow, Stockton, and
Wascher’s thinness measure with inﬂation
is biased down.11 Correlations of the other
symmetry test statistics with inﬂation are
not sensitive to skewness unrelated  to
downward nominal rigidity.
The evidence of strong skewness near
the median leaves little role for downward
nominal wage rigidity, and this is conﬁrmed
by little evidence of negative correlations
between the skewness test statistics and
inﬂation.  Alternatively, if I had found
strong negative correlations with inﬂation,
then the detected skewness near the median
would not be sufﬁciently strong to account
for overall skewness and thinning.  The
complementarity of these tests—near the
median and correlations with inﬂation—
is particularly useful in explaining differ-
ences across groups.  With only downward
nominal rigidity, groups with strong skew-
ness should have strong negative correla-
tions with inﬂation.  This link would be
broken if there were evidence—in the form
of skewness near the median—of an inter-
vening factor, another source of skewness.
Do Unions and Method of 
Pay Matter?
My results cover the sample of stayers.
Yet the literature has drawn a sharp distinc-
tion between hourly and salaried workers
(i.e., by method of pay), and perhaps a dis-
tinction should be drawn between union
and nonunion workers.  Do unions and
method of pay matter?
Table 5 contains the skewness test 
statistics, including difference-in-differ-
ence estimates based on histogram shifts,
by union status and method of pay.  Wage
changes of both union and nonunion
workers are skewed right, although the
wage changes of nonunion  workers seem 
to be more highly skewed.  This contra-
dicts my evidence, based on the skewness
coefﬁcient, that wage changes of nonunion
workers are symmetric (McLaughlin 1994).
The high variance of the skewness coefﬁ-
cient in the presence of a fat-tailed wage-
change distribution resolves the paradox.
A sharper distinction emerges between
hourly and salaried workers.  The evidence
of right-skewed wage changes for hourly
workers is overwhelming; wage changes of
salaried workers are also skewed, but the
11 Since Card and Hyslop (1997)
use the same thinness mea-
sure, their evidence of less thin-
ning in high inﬂation periods
suffers from the same bias.
Correlations of Skewness Statistics
With Inflation
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1971-92
Sample and Test Statistic  Inﬂation  Anticipated  Unanticipated
Inﬂation  Inﬂation
All Workers
Skewness Coefﬁcient  -0.30  -0.23  0.10
Mean-Median Difference  -0.07  –0.14  0.36
Sign Test Statistic  -0.08  –0.08  0.27
Thinness Measure-  –0.33  –0.50  0.31
Union Workers
Skewness Coefﬁcient  -0.03  –0.14  0.34
Mean-Median Difference  –0.55  –0.69  0.36
Sign Test Statistic  –0.53  –0.66  0.34
Thinness Measure-  –0.60  –0.68  0.27
Nonunion Workers
Skewness Coefﬁcient  -0.29  -0.24  0.06
Mean-Median Difference  -0.21  -0.11  0.18
Sign Test Statistic  -0.16  -0.07  0.16
Thinness Measure-  –0.10  –0.12  0.05
Hourly Workers
Skewness Coefﬁcient  -0.02  -0.05  0.06
Mean-Median Difference  –0.04  –0.37  0.72
Sign Test Statistic  –0.10  –0.38  0.60
Thinness Measure-  –0.65  –0.79  0.31
Salaried Workers
Skewness Coefﬁcient  -0.44  -0.37  0.13
Mean-Median Difference  -0.14  -0.08  0.12
Sign Test Statistic  -0.24  -0.17  0.14
Thinness Measure-  -0.27  -0.06  0.42
Table 4
a Correlations are computed on 21 annual observations. The sign test statistic is normalized by its
standard deviation.MAY/JUNE  1999
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departure from symmetry is much weaker.
For instance, thinning is less than half as
severe for salaried workers.
Table 5 also contains “near the median”
skewness tests by union status and method
of pay.  Again, skewness near the median
does not reﬂect downward nominal rigidity.
Near the median, wage changes of union
workers are symmetric, while those of non-
union workers are clearly skewed.  This
contrasts with the results by method of
pay.  Both hourly and salaried workers’
wage changes are weakly skewed right
near the median.  So, except in the case of
union workers, there is evidence that the
estimates of Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher
as well as Card and Hyslop overstate the
role of nominal rigidity in thinning the
wage change distribution below zero.
If the source of skewness were down-
ward rigidity, then the skewness coefﬁcients
would be negatively correlated with inﬂa-
tion, and this is conﬁrmed in Table 4 for
union and hourly workers.  On the union
and hourly samples, correlations of three of
the four test statistics with anticipated inﬂa-
tion (in the second column) are negative
and fairly strong.  There is no evidence of
inﬂation relaxing downward nominal rigidi-
ty for nonunion and salaried workers.
Integrating these results, I ﬁnd that the
skewness of union workers’ wage changes
is all attributable to nominal rigidity.  There
is no evidence of skewness near the medi-
an, and the skewness statistics are negative-
ly correlated with anticipated inﬂation.
The source of the strongly skewed wage
changes of nonunion workers, however, is
not nominal rigidity.  The skewness statis-
tics are not correlated with anticipated
inﬂation, and strong skewness of non-
union workers’ wage changes near the
median conﬁrms the result.  The wage
changes of hourly workers are strongly
skewed right, and some of this is unrelated
to nominal rigidity (based on skewness near
the median); since anticipated inﬂation
reduces the skewness of hourly workers’
wage changes, some of the skewness is a
consequence of nominal rigidity.  There is
Skewness Test Statistics by Union Status and Method of Paya
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1971-92
Difference-in-Difference
Sampleb Sample  Skewness  Mean –  Sign  Thinness  Interval 3  Interval 4
Size  Coefﬁcient  Median  Test  Measure
Entire Histogram
Union Workers  28,013  0.087  0.615  286.5  26.23  0.90  1.09
(0.232)  (0.151)  (44.7)
Nonunion Workers  22,749  0.226  0.773  721.5  28.24  2.55  0.60
(0.362)  (0.126)  (75.4)
Hourly Workers  14,271  1.674  1.106  839.5  10.85  NA  1.79
(1.341)  (0.108)  (59.7)
Salaried Workers  14,758  0.049  0.326  161.0  24.74  1.21  0.03
(0.288)  (0.175)  (60.7)
5 Point Band Around the Median
Union Workers  23,845  0.028  0.011  16.5
(0.023)  (0.043)  (31.0)
Nonunion Workers  28,796  0.062  0.057  140.0
(0.015)  (0.028)  (46.9)
Hourly Workers  27,056  0.047  0.055  120.0
(0.017)  (0.031)  (42.0)
Salaried Workers  24,996  0.022  0.083  265.0
(0.020)  (0.038)  (35.3)
Table 5
a 34,633 observations are the wage changes of ﬁrm stayers. Standard errors of the test statistics are reported in parentheses.
b Observations that change union status are excluded from the analysis by union, and those that change method of pay are excluded from the analysis by
method of pay.MAY/JUNE  1999
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no evidence of downward nominal rigidity
for salaried workers.  Indeed, salaried work-
ers’ wage changes exhibit only mild skew-
ness; that mild skewness is present near the
median, and none of the skewness statistics
is negatively correlated with inﬂation.
The union/nonunion comparison high-
lights the complementarity between the
“near the median” and “inﬂation correla-
tion” tests.  Although the wage changes of
nonunion workers are more skewed than
those of union workers, correlations with
inﬂation offer no evidence of downward
nominal rigidity for nonunion workers.
This would be anomalous if not for the evi-
dence of strong skewness of nonunion
workers’ wage changes near the median.
And this constitutes evidence of an inter-
vening factor, another source of skewness.
IF NOT NOMINAL RIGIDITY,
THEN WHAT? 
A theme emerges: There is more to
skewness of the wage-change distribution
than downward nominal rigidity.  If the
source of skewness is not nominal rigidity,
then what is it?  Consider three possibili-
ties.  First, perhaps there is an aversion to
wage cuts in real  terms, and this thins the
left side of the distribution of real wage
changes.  Since inﬂationary expectations
vary across employment matches, a focal
point at zero real-wage change is not
implied.  Downward real-wage rigidity
simply implies that wage changes would
be skewed to the right.
Second, self-selection skews wage
changes to the right (Weiss and Landau
1984).  The economic intuition is simple.
We observe the distribution of accepted
wage offers.  Some wage offers are not
accepted, and these are more likely to
come from the left side of the wage-change
distribution.  Offer a worker a 20 percent
wage increase, and he would be likely to
accept it; offer that worker a 20 percent
cut in pay and he would be likely to quit.
Indeed, rather than offer a worker a 20
percent cut, the employer would probably
just lay him off.  Hence, wage changes
from the left side of the distribution are
more likely to be truncated by turnover.
By analyzing the sample of stayers, we
introduce a bias toward right skew in the
distribution of wage changes.  And the size
of the bias is unknown.
Third, pooling of samples with differ-
ent distributions can generate spurious
skewness.  For instance, pooling samples
of workers from different industries, as I
have done herein, mixes the industry
wage-change distributions.  Mixing does
not preserve symmetry (McLaughlin
1999), so pooling industry samples might
skew the distribution of wage changes
even if each industry’s distribution were
symmetric.  Although this bias is poten-
tially serious, I ﬁnd that it is not the source
of skewness in the overall distribution
(McLaughlin 1999).
WHAT DOES THIS MEAN
FOR MONETARY POLICY?
My purpose has been to identify com-
mon patterns and themes in the burgeon-
ing literature on wage changes in panel
data.  Using data from the PSID, I conﬁrm
that wage changes are skewed to the right,
there is a spike at no change in nominal
pay, and below zero, the left side of the dis-
tribution is thinner than the right side.
These patterns have been identiﬁed in the
literature, but I cast new light on the subject.
I use several test statistics to detect
asymmetry, and I show that, with the
exception of the skewness coefﬁcient,
skewness tests are not sensitive to the
choice of a test statistic.  I identify the
source of the problem others have found
with the skewness coefﬁcient:  The fat tails
of the wage change distribution tend to
produce high-variance skewness coefﬁ-
cients.  In response to Card and Hyslop’s
(1997) criticism of Kahn’s (1997) his-
togram difference estimator of thinning, I
estimate a difference-in-difference version
of Kahn’s estimator, which strengthens her
results.  Since as much as half of the spike
at zero change in nominal wages might be
attributable to rounding errors and the
timing of survey interviews, I retest for
skewness excluding these observations.MAY/JUNE  1999
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The  evidence of skewness is weaker, but the
null hypothesis of symmetric wage changes
is still rejected.
There is more to the skewness of wage
changes than can be attributed to down-
ward rigidity at zero.  Here I break with
the literature.  First, I place the issue of
downward rigidity in a wider context by
documenting that nominal wage changes
move one-for-one with anticipated inﬂa-
tion.  Second, checking the mirror-image
assumption of Lebow, Stockton, and
Wascher (1995), and Card and Hyslop
(1997), I ﬁnd that wage changes near the
median are skewed.  This implies that the
estimates of thinning of nominal wage cuts
by Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher, as well
as Card and Hyslop, overstate the extent of
downward nominal rigidity.  It also means
that wage changes are skewed for reasons
unrelated to nominal rigidity, perhaps as a
result of self-selection associated with efﬁ-
cient turnover.  Third, conﬁrming my sus-
picion that skewness is not attributable to
nominal rigidity, I ﬁnd that the skewness
of wage changes is unrelated to inﬂation,
anticipated inﬂation, or unanticipated
inﬂation.  Fourth, although nonunion
workers’ wage changes are skewed to the
right, the source of the skewness is not
downward rigidity.  Yet the weakly skewed
wage changes of union workers do reﬂect
downward rigidity, because union workers’
wage changes near the median are not
skewed, and the test statistics on the union
sample are negatively correlated with
anticipated inﬂation.
Few areas of economic research have
more direct implications for economic 
policy than this one.  The thorn in the side
of the policy recommendation of stable
prices (i.e., zero inﬂation) has been the
labor market.  Workers are subject to
money illusion in the form of downward
rigidity of nominal wages, or so the story
goes.  I do detect some nominal rigidity 
for union and hourly workers, but the
magnitudes are smaller than others have
found.  And one must always remember
the wider context:  Nominal wages of
workers who do not change employers 
do move one-for-one with anticipated
inﬂation.  Consequently, the labor market
is not much of a thorn in the side of 
zero-inﬂation monetary policy.
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